Quantum secret sharing based on Smolin states alone by He, Guang Ping et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
71
1.
44
68
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
0 S
ep
 20
08
Quantum secret sharing based on Smolin states alone
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics & Engineering and Advanced Research Center,
Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
and Center of Theoretical and Computational Physics,
The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China
Z. D. Wang† and Yan-Kui Bai‡
Department of Physics and Center of Theoretical and Computational Physics,
The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China
It was indicated [Yu 2007 Phys. Rev. A 75 066301] that a previous proposed quantum secret
sharing (QSS) protocol based on Smolin states [Augusiak 2006 Phys. Rev. A 73 012318] is insecure
against an internal cheater. Here we build a different QSS protocol with Smolin states alone, and
prove it to be secure against known cheating strategies. Thus we open a promising venue for building
secure QSS using merely Smolin states, which is a typical kind of bound entangled states. We also
propose a feasible scheme to implement the protocol experimentally.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk,03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
The properties of Smolin states [1] have caught great
interests recently. It was shown [2, 3] that they can max-
imally violate simple correlation Bell inequalities, and
thus reduce communication complexity. On the other
hand, as a typical kind of bound entangled (i.e., cannot
be distilled to pure entangled form with local operations
and classical communications (LOCC) ) states, Smolin
states do not allow for secure key distillation. This indi-
cates that neither entanglement nor maximal violation of
Bell inequalities implies directly the presence of a quan-
tum secure key. Thus it becomes an intriguing question
how useful Smolin states can be for quantum cryptog-
raphy. Especially, it was left an open question in Refs.
[2, 3] whether Smolin states can lead to secure quantum
secret sharing (QSS) [4, 5]. This question was further in-
dicated to be non-trivial by Ref. [6], in which an explicit
cheating strategy was proposed, showing that a class of
QSS protocols using Smolin states can be broken if one
of the participants is dishonest.
In this paper, a four-party QSS protocol based on
Smolin states is proposed, and proven to be secure
against the cheating strategy proposed in Ref. [6] as well
as other known attacks. A feasible scheme for implement-
ing our protocol experimentally is proposed. Building
multi-party secure QSS protocols on generalized Smolin
states [2] is also addressed. These findings may help
to answer the question whether Smolin states and other
bound entangled states can lead to secure QSS.
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II. THE ORIGINAL PROTOCOL AND THE
CHEATING STRATEGY
The original Smolin state is a mixed state of four qubits
A, B, C and D described by the density matrix
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Here |Φ±〉 = (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2 and |Ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ±
|10〉)/√2 denote the four Bell states.
Now consider the task of QSS among four parties Al-
ice, Bob, Charlie and Diana. The model of QSS studied
in this paper includes the following essential features. (I)
The goal of the process is that Alice, who has a classi-
cal secret bit to be shared, encodes the bit with certain
quantum states and sends them to the other three par-
ties, so that they can retrieve the secret bit if and only if
all the three of them collaborate. (II) In QSS, it is gener-
ally assumed that Alice always acts honestly. That is, we
don’t consider the case where Alice wants to cause the
participants to accept inconsistent versions of her secret
bit. (III) A QSS protocol is called secure if it can stand
the following two types of attack, (1) “passive” attacks,
i. e., eavesdropping from external attackers, and (2) “ac-
tive attacks”, i. e., one or some of the legal participants
trying to gain non-trivial amount of information on the
secret bit without the collaboration of all participants
(except Alice).
Using other types of quantum states to accomplish
QSS has already been well studied in literatures [4, 5].
What we focus in this paper is the interesting question
raised by Refs. [2, 3] whether QSS can be accomplished
using quantum states having the form of Eq. (1), which
2is a typical example of bound entangled states. In Ref.
[6], the following QSS protocol was studied.
The original protocol:
Alice prepares a 4-qubit Smolin state in the form of
Eq. (1), and she keeps qubit A to herself, while send-
ing qubit B to Bob, qubit C to Charlie and qubit D
to Diana respectively. Each party then measures an ar-
bitrary Pauli matrix σi of his/her respective qubit, and
obtains a result rj ∈ {0, 1} (j = A,B,C,D). Then all
the parties announce publicly which observable they mea-
sured. If all of them measured the same observable, from
Eq. (1) it can be seen that their results always satisfy
rA ⊕ rB ⊕ rC ⊕ rD = 0 (⊕ means addition modulo 2).
Therefore, all the three parties, Bob, Charlie, and Diana,
together can reconstruct Alice’s secret bit rA.
It was proven in Ref. [2] that such a protocol would
be secure against the “passive” attacks of external eaves-
droppers. However, it was pointed out in Ref. [6] that
the protocol would be insecure if the internal participant
Bob cheats with the following intercept-resend strategy.
The cheating strategy:
Bob intercepts qubits C and D sent to Charlie and
Diana respectively by Alice, and measures them in the
Bell basis. This makes the Smolin state Eq. (1) collapse
into a tensor product of two Bell states with the same
form
|ψ〉ABCD = |ϕ〉AB ⊗ |ϕ〉CD . (2)
Here |ϕ〉 is one of the four Bell states |Φ±〉 and |Ψ±〉, and
from the result of his measurement, Bob knows which
Bell state |ϕ〉 is. He then resends the two qubits of such
a Bell state to Charlie and Diana respectively. Since the
Smolin state is merely a mixture of the product states in
the form of Eq. (2) where |ϕ〉 covers all the four possible
choices |Φ±〉 and |Ψ±〉, the states owned by Alice, Charlie
and Diana in this case show no difference from those in
the honest protocol. But since qubit B owned by Bob is
directly correlated with Alice’s qubit A now, Bob alone
can know Alice’s secret bit rA when they measure the
same observable, without the help of Charlie and Diana.
This strategy is not only adoptable by Bob. For ex-
ample, consider that Charlie intercepts qubits B and D
and measures them in the Bell basis. Note that when
swapping the position of two of the qubits (e.g., B and
C), |Φ±〉AB ⊗ |Φ±〉CD can be rewritten as
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Similar expression can also be found for |Ψ±〉AB ⊗|Ψ±〉CD. Therefore, after Charlie’s measurement, the
Smolin state Eq. (1) will collapse into
|ψ〉ACBD = |ϕ〉AC ⊗ |ϕ〉BD , (4)
where |ϕ〉 is one of the four Bell states |Φ±〉 and |Ψ±〉.
Comparing with Eq. (2), we can see that Charlie can
cheat with the same strategy. So does Diana.
III. SIMPLIFIED CHEATING STRATEGY
Defeating this cheating alone is easy. Since it requires
the cheater to perform joint measurement on the qubits
of the other two parties, we can restrict Alice to send
the qubits one at a time. That is, she does not send
the qubit to the next party until the receipt of the qubit
sent to the last party was confirmed. With this method,
the cheater can never have the qubits of the other two
parties simultaneously. Thus he cannot perform joint
measurement on them and the strategy is defeated.
Nevertheless, we would like to pinpoint out that there
is an even more simple cheating strategy which does not
require any joint measurement. The cheater can simply
intercept every qubit and measure the same observable of
them (including his own one). Then he resends the mea-
sured qubits to the corresponding parties. As a result,
if Alice also measured the same observable of her qubit,
the cheater can infer her result since he has measured all
the other three qubits. Else if Alice measured a differ-
ent observable, the result of the four qubits will not have
any correlation so that the cheating will not be detected.
Since this strategy involves individual measurement only,
it could be successful even if Alice sends the qubits one
at a time.
IV. OUR PROTOCOL
If our purpose is merely to achieve secure QSS, it is
not difficult to defeat all the above cheating strategies.
For example, Alice can also prepare some qubits in pure
states. She mixes some of these qubits with qubit B (C
or D) and sends them to Bob (Charlie or Diana). By
requiring the other parties to announce their measure-
ment result on some of these pure states, she can easily
check whether there is intercept-resend attacks on the
quantum communication channel between her and each
of the other three parties. After all three quantum chan-
nels are verified secure, she tells the other three parties
which qubits are B, C and D, then they can accomplish
the task of secret sharing with these qubits as described
in the original protocol. Alternatively, Alice can prepare
many copies of Smolin states. She keeps qubits A, B and
C of each copy to herself, and sends qubit D to one of the
other parties. By measuring A and B in the Bell basis,
she can collapse C and D into a Bell state. With the
3Bell state, she can set up a secret key with each of the
other parties with the well-known quantum key distribu-
tion protocol [7]. Then the sharing of her secret data can
easily be achieved with these secret keys.
However, these methods cannot help to answer the
question whether Smolin states and bound entanglement
can lead to secure QSS. This is because when pure states
are involved, or one party owns more than one qubit of a
Smolin state, the correlation shared between the parties
is no longer pure bound entanglement. Therefore, it is
important to study whether a secure QSS protocol can
be built in the framework where only Smolin states are
used, and each party can have one qubit of each copy of
Smolin state only, i.e., the honest operation on Smolin
states must be local operations on single qubit rather
than joint ones on many qubits. Here we purpose such a
exotic protocol.
Our secure protocol:
(1) Alice prepares n copies of the 4-qubit Smolin state
in the form of Eq. (1). She keeps qubit Aj of the jth
copy (j = {1, ..., n}) to herself, while sending qubits
Bj to Bob, qubits Cj to Charlie and qubits Dj to Di-
ana (j = {1, ..., n}) respectively. But different from the
original protocol, the order of the qubits sent to each
party should be random. That is, the qubit sequence
received by Bob, for example, can be B3B6B5B11B4...,
while that of Charlie and Diana can be C4C2C9C7C5...
and D4D20D7D3D1... respectively. The order should be
kept secret by Alice herself. Also, each qubit should be
sent only after the receipt of the previous one is confirmed
by the corresponding party.
(2) Alice tells the other three parties which observable
to measure for each of their qubit. She should guarantee
that the same observable are measured for the four qubits
of the same copy. But which qubits belong to the same
copy should still be kept secret.
(3) Alice randomly chooses some qubits for the security
check. For these qubits, she asks the other three parties
to announce the result of their measurement, and checks
whether rAj ⊕ rBj ⊕ rCj ⊕ rDj = 0 is satisfied whenever
Aj , Bj , Cj and Dj belonging to the same copy are chosen
for the check.
(4) If no disagreed result is found, Alice randomly picks
one of the remaining unchecked copy (suppose that it
is the kth copy) for secret sharing. She tells the other
three parties the position of qubits Bk, Ck and Dk, so
that all the other three parties together can reconstruct
Alice’s secret bit rAk for this copy from the equation
rAk ⊕ rBk ⊕ rCk ⊕ rDk = 0.
Now we show that the following three important fea-
tures together make our protocol secure against known
cheating strategies: (i) the randomness in the secret or-
der of the qubits being sent; (ii) each qubit is sent only
after the receipt of the previous one is confirmed; (iii)
it is decided by Alice which observable the other parties
should measure, and it is not announced until the receipt
of all qubits is confirmed.
Let us consider the most severe case where the num-
ber of cheaters is as large as possible. As stated above,
Alice is always assumed to be honest in QSS. Now if all
the other three parties are cheaters, then they can surely
obtain the secret data because any secret sharing proto-
col allows the secret to be retrievable when all the three
parties collaborate, even without cheating. Therefore it
is natural to assume that there are two cheaters at the
most. For concreteness and without loss of generality,
here we study the case where Diana is honest while both
Bob and Charlie are cheaters and they can perform any
kind of communication (either classical or quantum) with
each other. In fact, due to the symmetric form of Smolin
states, the same security analysis on this case can also
apply to the cases where the two cheaters are Bob and
Diana, or Charlie and Diana. Also, note that external
eavesdroppers have less advantages than internal cheaters
since they can attack the quantum communication chan-
nel only, while cannot alter the announcement sent via
the classical channel to cover their attacks. Thus if a
QSS protocol is proven secure against internal cheaters,
it is also secure against external eavesdroppers. There-
fore, the case studied here is sufficient for the security
proof.
Let us formulate the model of the cheating strategy
of the cheaters Bob and Charlie. Suppose that they in-
tercepted a qubit being sent to Diana. Due to the fea-
tures (ii) of our protocol, they must decide immediately
what kind of qubit should be resent to Diana. There can
be four choices: (a) resend the intercepted qubit intact
to Diana; (b) perform an operation (including project-
ing the state into a certain basis, performing an unitary
transformation, or making it entangled with other sys-
tems, etc.) on the intercepted qubit, and then send it
to Diana; (c) Prepare another qubit, which may even en-
tangled with other systems kept by Bob and Charlie, and
send it to Diana; and (d) send Diana another qubit which
was sent to Bob or Charlie, or is previously sent to Diana
but intercepted by Bob and Charlie. Choice (a) is obvi-
ously not a cheating anymore. Meanwhile, all the other
choices can be summarized as: Bob and Charlie prepare
the following system
|bc⊗ d〉 =
∑
i
|βi〉bc ⊗ |γi〉d . (5)
Here system d is the qubit they will resend to Diana,
while system bc can be the system kept at their side and
the environment, and may even include the systems of
Alice’s and Diana’s in choices (b) and (d), and i covers
all possible states of these systems. Note that if they
measure the original qubit and then send Diana the re-
sultant state in choice (b), then system d is in a pure
state that does not entangled with system bc, which is
simply a special case of Eq. (5).
After Diana receives the qubit, due to feature (iii) of
our protocol, the cheaters cannot control the result of
Diana’s measurement. Since the qubit is not the origi-
nal one, Diana’s result does not always show correlation
4of Smolin states. To avoid the uncorrelated result from
being detected by Alice, the only method left for the
cheaters is to adjust their own announcement in step (3)
of the protocol so that their result looks to be correlated
with that of Diana’s. Indeed, after step (2) they can
know what result should have been found by Diana by
measuring the original qubit they intercepted, and it is
also possible for them to know the actual result of Diana’s
measurement by properly measuring the system bc (if it is
completely kept at their side) after they monitor Alice’s
announcement to Diana in step (2). However, when they
need to determine their announcement in step (3), Alice
has not announced the ordering of the qubits (i.e., which
qubits belong to the same copy of Smolin state) yet. Note
that it is insufficient for Bob and Charlie to obtain infor-
mation on this ordering by comparing the measurement
directions Alice announced in step (2) either. This is be-
cause totally there are only three measurement direction
(corresponding to the three Pauli matrices), while the
number of copies of Smolin state is large. Consequently,
there will be a large number of qubits which do not belong
to the same copy of Smolin state, while the measurement
directions listed by Alice are the same. As the number
of copies of Smolin state used in the protocol increases,
the amount of mutual information on the ordering Bob
and Charlie gain by comparing the measurement direc-
tions will drop exponentially to zero. Therefore, for the
qubits chosen for the security check, feature (i) ensures
that Bob and Charlie do not know which announcement
of their own should be adjusted. Then for any single
copy of Smolin state chosen for the security check in step
(3), the cheaters stand a non-trivial probability (denoted
as ε) to make an inconsistent announcement. The total
probability for the cheaters to escape the detection will
be at the order of (1 − ε)m, where m is the number of
copies of Smolin state to which Bob and Charlie apply
the attack. This probability drops exponentially to zero
asm increases, so the cheating will inevitably be detected
if m is large. On the other hand, if m is small, the prob-
ability for these m copies of Smolin state to be chosen
as the kth copy for the final secret sharing in step (4)
will drop to zero as the total number of copies of Smolin
state used in the protocol increases, so that the cheating
is fruitless. Thus it is proven that our protocol is secure
against the cheating strategy above.
It is important to note that in our protocol, after Alice
performs permutation on all Smolin states, the resultant
states are still bound-entangled. The reason is that the
permutation operation can in fact be viewed as a local
operation, because in step (1) of the protocol, the qubit
sequence received by Bob is merely the permutation of
all Bj ’s (e.g., B3B6B5B11B4...), while that of Charlie
and Diana are all Cj ’s and Dj ’s respectively. There is
no joint operation between the qubits A, B, C and D.
That is, suppose that the four participants share many
copies of Smolin state, each participant has one qubit
from each copy. Then the above permutation can be ac-
complished by each participants locally. It is a known
fact that Smolin states cannot be distilled to pure en-
tangled form with LOCC. Therefore the resultant states
still cannot be distilled with LOCC either, thus it still
satisfy the definition of bound entangled states. For this
reason, what we achieved here is not merely another QSS
protocol. The significance of our result is that the QSS
protocol proposed here is based on bound entangled state
alone.
We have to point out that we currently cannot prove
the generality of the model of the cheating strategy we
studied above, because there may potentially exist strate-
gies which are beyond our current imagination. There-
fore, whether our specific protocol is unconditionally se-
cure against any cheating strategy or not is still an open
question. Nevertheless, the above model seems to cover
all attacks currently known. Therefore, before a different
cheating strategy fell outside the above model could be
found in the future, our result seems to give a positive
answer to the question whether Smolin states alone can
lead to secure QSS. This is in contrast to the conclusion
of Ref. [6].
It also seems that generalized Smolin states [2] can
lead to secure quantum secret sharing between more par-
ticipants too. Here the generalized Smolin states mean
the 2n-qubit (n > 2) bound entangled states defined
as follows. Let U
(m)
n = I⊗n−1 ⊗ σm (m = 0, 1, 2, 3,
n = 1, 2, 3, ...) be a class of unitary operations, where
σ0 = I is the identity acting on the 2-dimensional Hilbert
space C2 and σi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) are the standard Pauli ma-
trices. Let ρ2 = |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|, and denote the density ma-
trix of the original 4-qubit Smolin state (Eq. (1)) as ρ4.
Then the density matrix of 2n-qubit (n > 2) generalized
Smolin state is
ρ2n =
1
4
3∑
m=0
U
(m)
2(n−1)ρ2(n−1)U
(m)
2(n−1) ⊗ U
(m)
2 ρ2U
(m)
2 . (6)
(Please see Ref. [2] for details.) When the state is shared
by 2n parties (each party has one qubit) and they mea-
sure the same observable, their results will always sat-
isfy
∑2n
j=1⊕rj = 0. Therefore we can see that a secure
quantum secret sharing between Alice and other (2n−1)
parties can be accomplished with a protocol similar to
our above secure protocol with original Smolin states, by
including the following main features. (i) Alice prepares
many copies of the 2n-qubit generalized Smolin state,
and sends them to the other parties in random order. It
is not announced which qubits belong to the same copy,
until all secure checks are successfully finished. (ii) Each
qubit is sent only after the receipt of the previous one is
confirmed. (iii) It is decided by Alice which observable
the other parties should measure, and it is not announced
until the receipt of all qubits is confirmed.
5V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
Thus we proposed a QSS protocol secure against
known cheating strategies. We would like to emphasize
that the present protocol is, to our best knowledge, the
first example of secure QSS in terms of bound entangled
states alone. This result suggests an positive answer to
the question in Refs. [2, 3] whether Smolin states can
lead to secure QSS. As to the more general question in
Refs. [3] whether there are cases when violation of local
realism is necessary but not sufficient condition for QSS,
our result seems to suggest that we need not to search
for such cases in the framework of the original and gen-
eralized Smolin states.
Our protocol is also feasible for practical implemen-
tation. At the first glance, there seems to have a diffi-
culty since the qubits received by Bob, Charlie and Diana
in step (1) need to be kept unmeasured until Alice an-
nounces which observable to measure in step (2). To this
date, keeping a quantum state for a long period of time
is still a technical challenge. Nevertheless, in practice
Alice can uses the well-known quantum key distribution
protocol (e.g., Ref. [7]) to setup a secret string with
each of the other parties beforehand, so that she can tell
him secretly which observable he is to measure. Then
delaying the measurement is no longer necessary. There-
fore our protocol can be implemented as long as a source
of Smolin states is available. Though in this case, not
merely bound entangled states are used in the protocol,
it is made simple to realize secure QSS with state-of-the-
art technology.
Finally, we would like to propose a feasible scheme to
prepare Smolin states experimentally [2]. The quantum
circuit for this scheme is shown in Fig.1. The input part
contains six qubits, in which the ancillary qubits α and β
are initialized in state |++〉αβ (here, |+〉 = (|0〉+|1〉)/
√
2)
and the target qubits in the tensor product of two Bell
states |Φ+〉AB⊗|Φ+〉CD. First, let β be the control qubit
and perform the controlled-σz operations on qubits βA
and βC, respectively. Then, let α be the control qubit
and perform the controlled-σx operations on qubits αB
and αD, respectively. This procedure of the target qubits
can be formulated by
ρSABCD = Trαβ [UρinU
†], (7)
where the input state is ρin = |ψ〉in 〈ψ| with |ψ〉in =
|++〉αβ ⊗ |Φ+〉AB ⊗ |Φ+〉CD, and the unitary transfor-
mation takes the form
U = |00〉αβ 〈00| ⊗ IABCD
+ |01〉αβ 〈01| ⊗ σAz σCz IBD
+ |10〉αβ 〈10| ⊗ IACσBx σDx
+ |11〉αβ 〈11| ⊗ σAz σBx σCz σDx . (8)
After this procedure, the output state will be the desired
quantum state, i.e., the Smolin state ρSABCD. Therefore
with any source of Bell states currently available, Smolin
states may be generated with this scenario, and thus our
protocol is expected to be implemented in principle in
near future.
D
E
AB
)
CD
)
Z
V
Z
V
X
V
X
V
S
ABCD
U
FIG. 1: The quantum circuit for generating the Smolin state.
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